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Introduction: The Substance of the Shadow
The purpose here is to examine human intelligence (humint) and counterintelligence
during the American Civil War with an eye to determining effects on military operations
and to identifying fundamental shortcomings. The Civil War marked a watershed both
in American history and in the annals of warfare. It established the predominance of the
Federal government, subordinating states’ rights to national authority in various
spheres, and finally eliminating assertions of “state sovereignty.” Before the Civil War,
the United States, primarily an agrarian society, was still a plural noun in common
usage (the United States are). Thereafter, it would develop steadily into an industrial
power, and would become a singular noun (the United States is).
Likewise, the Civil War represented a turning point in some aspects of warfare.
Mounted cavalry was still an important military instrument, and frontal assaults not
infrequent, but repeating rifles had become prevalent, and even machine-guns were
making an appearance. Rifle-pits, earthworks, and fire-trenches foreshadowed the
ghastly stalemate of World War I. At sea, submarines and mines, then known as
torpedoes, claimed many victims, further portending twentieth-century maritime
conflict. The Monitor and the Merrimack, renamed the Virginia by the Confederacy,
fought the first sea-battle between ironclads.
With respect to intelligence and clandestine operations, the U.S. Civil War was a
transitionary point of time and would begin ushering in substantial changes. Among
other things, it brought intimations of the modern national security state. Habeas
corpus was suspended in the name of public safety in wartime, and civil liberties were
curtailed. The notion of “all-source” intelligence was developed by the Secret Service
headed in the early days of the war by Allan Pinkerton, whose name remains familiar
today because of the detective agency he founded. Intelligence, counterintelligence, and
even “disinformation” networks evolved in both the Union and the Confederacy.
Pinkerton made his reputation at the beginning of the war by uncovering a plot to
assassinate President Abraham Lincoln, an early example of effective
counterintelligence. At the war’s end, his successor in the Secret Service, Lafayette
Baker, ignored information about the plans of Southern sympathizers to murder the
President until it was too late, a notable counterintelligence failure. Baker was never
able to account satisfactorily for the agent who was absent the night the President was
shot. Nor was the Secret Service at a higher stage of readiness at the time.
Live and Let Die
By modern standards, of course, the scope of intelligence in the Civil War was limited,
the process ad hoc. Yet, intelligence activities would progress into more modern
conceptions of operational and strategic intelligence, directed toward “who has what,
where, and what they plan to do with it”; technological intelligence, focusing on enemy
weapon systems and developments; and counterintelligence, involving protection of
crucial information and assets. Today, one associates technological intelligence with
missiles and other sophisticated weapon systems, yet one might add parenthetically that
technological intelligence was previously the specialty of naval intelligence. It is not
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coincidental that James Bond is a British naval officer, or that the “black chambers” of
the great powers of the early twentieth century were organized and staffed by naval
personnel. The concept of technological secrecy came into its own with the British
construction of the Dreadnought, the first modern battleship. So secretive was the
project and so effective the security surrounding it that little was known of the
Dreadnought before it was actually launched.1 Prior to this time, details of warship
construction were widely publicized.
With numerous military innovations, such as ironclads, torpedoes, submarines and
minefields, the Civil War offered ample opportunity for espionage, even though neither
side made much effort to conceal technological advancements. Few troubled themselves
much to hide the development of nineteenth-century Wunderwaffen. Both sides knew
about each other’s development of ironclad vessels, for example, although the South
failed to anticipate the rapid deployment of the Union’s Monitor. In land warfare, major
technological innovations were widely comprehended, and essential elements of
operational intelligence concentrated largely on determination of troop movements and
dispositions.
Without doubt, the prevailing lack of effectiveness has invited dramatization of Civil
War intelligence over the years. Female spies inveigled information from government
officials and military officers, and carried secret messages on their persons. Their
exploits, clever as these sometimes were, seldom contributed significantly to the
outcome of battle, though. Military histories mention such deeds tangentially, but
observers do not usually afford these much serious consideration. And although spies
tended to emerge and be recruited from the fringes of society, intelligence operatives
were to be found in all walks of life.2 Elizabeth Van Lew, an aristocratic Southern belle,
became a spy for the North. Rose O’Neal Greenhow, a leading Washington society
personage, spied for the South. Not generally known, yet all the more remarkable, is that
Harriet Tubman, of Underground Railroad fame, also served as a Union intelligence
operative, utilizing the contacts and safehouses she developed before the outbreak of
hostilities in the Union war effort.3 The continued operation of the Underground
Railroad reminds us that the Civil War was, in substance, an ideological conflict. Slavery
was at the root of the “states rights” issue, and the extension of slavery into the
territories was a direct cause of war. Little room for compromise and moderation existed
when passions ran as high as they did by the late 1850s. A consequence of the intense
emotions the slavery question aroused was that a pool of recruits for clandestine service
was readily available, and many on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line simply
appointed themselves intelligence operatives.
You Only Live Twice
More often than not, intelligence and counterintelligence personnel were selected and
assumed their duties largely by happenstance. Pinkerton, America’s first spymaster, was
Breyer, Siegfried, Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905-1970, trans. Alfred Kurti (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Company, 1973), 46-49.
2 Ind, Allison, A Short History of Espionage (New York: David McKay, 1963), 99.
3 Smedley, R.C., History of the Underground Railroad (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 250.
1
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a case in point. Pinkerton made a name for himself as an astute railway detective before
the war, and it was in the course of protecting the railroads against sabotage by prosecession zealots that he stumbled upon the plot to assassinate the President when the
latter was traveling to Washington for his inauguration. He contacted Lincoln’s staff,
and together they arranged for the President to enter the city secretly on the night of
February 22, 1861.4 Impressed by this initial performance, Lincoln asked Pinkerton to
head the Union’s Secret Service, founded in 1860 by the Treasury Department. As the
war ground on, Pinkerton’s organization became a nascent intelligence-collection,
counterespionage, and anti-terrorist outfit. Baker, Pinkerton’s successor as head of the
Secret Service, was an ardent abolitionist who waged clandestine war against the
Confederacy with a vengeance.
It is noteworthy, and perhaps a little ironic, that Southern intelligence operatives were
less often drawn to service by ideological fervor. The more idealistic of them, as was true
of some Confederate military leaders such as Robert E. Lee or Thomas J. “Stonewall”
Jackson, were not enamored of the Southern “cause” so much as they displayed a keen
loyalty to their native state and people. For example, one of the most colorful of all the
Civil War's spies, Belle Boyd, was seventeen years old when a group of Union soldiers
occupied her family's farm and attempted to raise the Union flag over it. When an officer
insulted her mother, Belle shot the man dead. After a military tribunal released her, she
acted largely on impulse to collect intelligence on Union forces, often by using her
charms to extract information from unwary Federal officers. On more than one
occasion, she warned Confederate units of impending attacks. “Stonewall” Jackson once
expressed his debt of gratitude to her.5
Eventually, Belle Boyd was arrested for espionage, then exchanged. She traveled to
England, and was alleged to have married a Union naval officer. By one account, she was
captured on a blockade-runner and applied her feminine wiles to the prize officer, who
was later court-martialed and cashiered from the service. Some say she enticed him to
spy for the Confederacy thereafter. By another account, the officer was indeed
enraptured, but married her only after the war.6 However it may be, she went on to
make her name and fortune after the war by publicizing her espionage adventures.
During her modest stage career, she billed herself “Cleopatra of the Succession” and the
“Siren of the Shenandoah.” This sequel to her intelligence collection activities during the
war brings to the fore a problem inherent in all accounts of nineteenth-century
espionage and counter-espionage, that of authenticity. Espionage is an intrinsically
difficult area in which to ascertain facts. Before the growth of intelligence bureaucracies,
personal memoirs of spies and their contacts were often the chief source of information,
and such accounts lend themselves to being spiced and adorned, with no one able to
gainsay. Even in the twentieth century, with intelligence operations far more centralized
and formally organized, official accounts are often kept secret for many years, and are
themselves subject to tampering for a variety of reasons, usually self-serving ones.

The Civil War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1982), 365-66.
Seth, Ronald, Some of My Favorite Spies (New York: Chilton Book Company, 1968), 40-41.
6 Ind, A Short History of Espionage, 107-109.
4
5
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The dearth of reliable material and sources in part explains the extensive discussion of
women in Civil War intelligence collection, and the human interest appeal of their
exploits abets romanticizing. Women did, in fact, often assume a prominent role in
intelligence collection, sometimes simply by default, since intelligence organizations
were in an embryonic stage and centralized intelligence was nascent. Civilian
populations were frequently in close proximity to and had considerable contact with
military forces, a circumstance conducive to conveying crucial information and timely
news. People with intense feelings one way or another had opportunities to undertake
actions on their own. Many, if not most, intelligence couriers were women, above all,
because they could usually pass through the lines without much difficulty. Throughout
the war, women were accustomed to moving about relatively freely, even in enemyoccupied territory. Who was to refute that they were merely out and about visiting their
“men folk”?
The restrictive lives women tended to lead in the past would not seem to have equipped
them either with the requisite self-confidence or the professional skills for conducting
intelligence operations. Herein lies a paradox, though.7 Archaic nineteenth-century
notions of chivalry, especially in the South, rendered women above suspicion and often
protected them from severe punishment, hence heightening their value as spies
immensely. Rose Greenhow and Belle Boyd survived arrest. Men in a like situation were
often summarily executed. The nurse-spy Emma Edmonds, an abolitionist Southerner
determined to serve the anti-slavery cause, fit the pattern neatly as well.8 While working
as nurse, she volunteered to replace a male Union spy in Richmond who had been
hanged. She made numerous trips across the lines, at times disguised as a black man.
Her cover was nearly blown when she was set to hard labor. Thereafter, she would
usually disguise herself as a black woman, and occasionally as an Irish camp-follower.
Edmonds came and went as she chose, arousing few suspicions, even when crossing the
lines. To boot, she demonstrated no lack of cunning in her endeavors.
Close civilian-military contacts coupled with almost astonishing laxity in security
sometimes resulted in remarkable espionage sagas. “Rebel Rose” Greenhow, society lady
and social climber of humble origins, who had married into a prominent Richmond
family and later entertained Washington’s elite, is legendary. After becoming a widow,
she also became a sort of high-class courtesan. Among her frequent visitors was
bachelor President James Buchanan. Her political connections, strong Southern
sympathies, and outright contempt for Lincoln and the Republicans, compelled her to
serve as a Confederate spy. “The Rebel Rose” was instrumental in establishing a
Confederate spy ring in Washington prior to the outbreak of war. In conjunction with
Thomas Jordan, a military officer of Confederate persuasion stationed in Washington in
1861, she proceeded to recruit Confederate operatives in the Federal bureaucracy,
including in the War Department.9
In the early phases of the war, the “Rebel Rose” continued to receive gentlemen callers
including senior officers, congressmen, and even members of Lincoln’s Cabinet. From
7
8
9

Newman, Bernard, Epics of Espionage (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 64.
Singer, Kurt, Three Thousand Years of Espionage (New York: Prentice Hall, 1948), 122-30.
Ind, A Short History of Espionage, 80-87.
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such high-level contacts, she gleaned information that was initially of considerable value
to operations. Her courier, for example, kept Confederate generals posted on Union
troop movements on the eve of the First Battle of Manassas. She even acquired a
genuine copy of Union General Irwin McDowell’s order-of-battle. Partly through her
efforts, the Battle of Manassas turned into a critical Confederate victory, and it certainly
represented a sobering experience for her Washington social acquaintances, many of
whom turned out in holiday spirit fully expecting to see the rebels run. Since the
engagement was such a near-run affair, and Union victory at Manassas might well have
precipitated a moral collapse of the Confederacy, one should not make light of “Rebel
Rose” intelligence.
Notwithstanding widespread suspicions about her, the “Rebel Rose” continued to
operate fairly openly even late into 1862, and counterintelligence efforts were feeble and
largely ineffectual. When Pinkerton’s men began to close the net around her, she
circulated petitions denouncing such “persecution,” and availed herself of high-level
political connections. She could not simply be apprehended and put on trial, because
arrest was a politically delicate issue in this instance. The “Rebel Rose” had befriended
too many important people. When the Secret Service endeavored to use her house as a
“mousetrap,” that is, as a counterintelligence instrument, by keeping track of comings
and goings, Greenhow developed her own countermeasures.10 She also used coded
correspondence, apparently even after her eventual internment. Pinkerton made
arrangements to read her mail, some of which consisted of vapid and seemingly
innocuous high-society chit-chat addressed to one “Aunt Sally.”11 Some of the
correspondences were certainly encoded, but Pinkerton and his agents made no effort to
discover the identity of “Aunt Sally,” or to determine whether she existed at all.
Greenhow understood the need for timely intelligence, utilizing at least three female
couriers, Betty Duval, Lillie MacKall and Antonia Ford, to carry messages through the
lines. It was Duvall who carried a packet of information to the Confederate forces on the
eve of the First Battle of Manassas. Later, as the war dragged on with no end in sight to
the appalling slaughter, feelings hardened, the Federal government became less
fastidious about respect for civil liberties, and Greenhow was imprisoned. Nonetheless,
security in Washington remained slack, and lips were often loose. Counterintelligence
operations still had a long way to go, and in the case of “The Rebel Rose,” apparently no
one thought of planting disinformation on her. Had this been done, she could have
become a valuable Union asset. Perhaps nothing, though, could better demonstrate
counterintelligence amateurism than Greenhow’s arrest at her residence. A basic maxim
of counterintelligence tells one to avoid under all circumstances apprehending a
suspected spy at home. As it turned out, “The Rebel Rose” used one of her female
couriers to smuggle out the most compromising evidence, right under Pinkerton’s nose.
By no means, though, did Washington have a monopoly on lax security. Critical
information often flowed out of Richmond and other Southern cities as sand through a
sieve. If Union counterintelligence operations were at best rudimentary, Confederate
ones were, if anything, worse. The cardinal reason is to be found largely in the
decentralized nature of the Confederate polity. The Confederacy’s constituent parts were
10
11

Newman, Epics of Espionage, 40.
Ind, A Short History of Espionage, 87.
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jealously protective of their sovereignty; “states rights” remained the rallying cry; and to
the bitter end Confederate leaders were unable or unwilling to impose the sort of
societal discipline necessary to conduct a protracted conflict for the highest stakes.
Effective wartime counterintelligence, with its attendant restrictive measures, requisite
investigations and curtailment of civil liberties, might not have been possible in the
Confederacy.
The Confederacy’s designated spycatcher was General John Henry Winder, who headed
the “Safety Committee,” which passed for a counterintelligence organization, but was
notoriously inefficient and corrupt. One of Winder’s chief detectives, Philip Cashmeyer,
was a double agent and in the employ of Elizabeth Van Lew. Union operatives regularly
reported how Winder and his subordinates could be bribed to issue travel passes. Few
questions were asked when the money was right.12 Five Pinkerton agents made a total of
fourteen trips to Richmond from October 1861 to April 1862, serving as couriers and
entering the city fairly easily.13 In the spring of 1862, with huge Federal armies poised to
strike the Confederate capital from the east, more astute intelligence operatives might
have ascertained how weak the Confederate defenses were. To be sure, a more
enterprising Union general than George McClellan would have insisted on better
intelligence, accepted the risks, reconciled himself to the casualties, and pushed
forward.
Of Vexation and Vanity
Elizabeth Van Lew of Richmond took it upon herself to spy for the North, and on her
own initiative established an intelligence network in Virginia. Van Lew turned against
slavery at a fairly early age, so great an impropriety in a proper Southern lady that she
was widely referred to as “Crazy Bet,” and became a pariah. The openness of her
sympathies, but above all, the common perception she was not quite sane, to which she
contributed by a disheveled and untidy appearance, served as suitable cover for her
activities. Despite all the evidence, few harbored genuine suspicions about “Crazy Bet,”
and a counterintelligence operation was never seriously considered.14
Her espionage network in the very heart of the Confederacy would spread its tentacles
wide, and, moreover, Van Lew would assist with escapes of Union prisoners-of-war, in
one instance, arranging a breakout of over one-hundred men. On these activities she
spent much of her fortune, and what should have been suspicious eccentricities became
merely a matter of public record. An article in a Richmond newspaper spoke of “two
ladies, mother and daughter, living on Church Hill…who attracted public notice by their
assiduous attention to Yankee prisoners.”15 Such behavior in the North after 1863 would
in all likelihood have landed the perpetrators in jail. One cannot be certain that her
espionage had much operational effect, though in terms of sheer amounts of
information delivered expeditiously she was one of the most proficient female spies in
Markle, Donald E., Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1994), 4.
Fishel, Edwin C., The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil
War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 564.
14 Newman, Epics of Espionage, 42.
15 Markle, Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War, 181.
12
13
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history. From a humanitarian standpoint, the significance of the prisoner escapes she
helped organize speaks for itself. As with Greenhow, it is remarkable that a fairly wellknown woman, with plain-spoken enemy sympathies, was able to collect intelligence in
the capital city with little hindrance. Like the “Rebel Rose,” she understood intuitively
the importance of timely intelligence. Establishing a series of courier safehouses
reaching to the Union lines, she collected intelligence in the Confederate capital, then
dispatched it quickly to the Federal commanders. So efficient did the operation become,
that toward the war’s end, fresh flowers arrived at General Grant’s headquarters almost
daily with encrypted messages inside, care of the Van Lew network. After the war, a
grateful Federal government rewarded Van Lew by appointing her Postmistress of
Richmond. Some precautious officials in all likelihood thought she would be able to
keep track of potential vengeful adherents to the “lost cause” in such a public office. Her
customers for the most part distained her as a turncoat, though, and she was finally
demoted to a minor clerkship. When she died in 1900, the only mourners at her funeral
were former servants and the relatives of Union soldiers she helped to escape from
Southern prisons. Several were kinfolk of Colonel Paul Revere, the grandson of the
Revolutionary War hero, whom she had concealed in her home after he had bolted
captivity.16 They arranged to have a gravestone with the following inscription placed at
the burial site: She risked everything that is dear to man—friends, fortune, comfort,
health, life itself, all for the one absorbing desire of her heart—that slavery might be
abolished and the Union preserved.
Lafayette Baker made his military intelligence debut by gaining an interview with
General Winfield Scott and volunteering to collect information on Confederate
positions, weapons and troop movements. He determined that his cover should be an
itinerant photographer, in the manner of the well-known, professional photographer
Matthew Brady, and in fact, photographic espionage originated in the Civil War.17 On
the Confederate side, A.D. Lytle would photograph Federal units in the Louisiana area,
providing some useful information to Southern commanders. Pinkerton would employ
Alexander Gardner as a photographic covert operator, and General William T. Sherman
used photography to develop maps and assess terrain in his Georgia and South Carolina
campaigns.
One can scarcely think of an activity less subtle than an intelligence agent going about
his business with a bulky camera in tow. Photography was still a novelty at the time of
the Civil War, however, and officers and troops were only too happy to pose for
portraits.18 Simple vanity in some cases presented itself, and Confederate cavalry
General J.E.B. Stuart and other high-ranking officers once posed for Baker. Celebrated
as the “last cavalier,” Stuart was courtly and high-headed, but not one of the hard-eyed
men the war would later produce. His sense of the need for operational security left
something to be desired, and the cavalier displayed little grasp of counterintelligence
fundamentals. The dust on antique time would lie unswept.

16
17
18

Newman, Epics of Espionage, 184.
Markle, Spies and Spymasters of the Civil War, xviii.
Singer, Three Thousand Years of Espionage, 104-10.
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It even borders on the farcical that Baker’s camera was not functional, but merely a
means to acquire access to the Confederate Army. Granted, he could exploit the vanity
of Confederate officers well enough, but it seems not to have dawned on him that with a
functioning camera he could have taken photographs which themselves would have
been of intelligence value, as others had already been doing. Instead, he found himself
forced to move on when his customers requested non-existent portraits.
The game was finally up for him, though, when he fell under suspicion and was arrested.
What followed was one of the more bizarre episodes of the entire war, when Baker was
taken to Richmond and personally interrogated by Confederate President Jefferson
Davis. Perhaps nothing can better demonstrate the crying want of counterintelligence or
the absence of adequate staff work generally than the specter of the Confederate
President personally interviewing a suspected enemy spy. Black chambers and hardbitten counterintelligence agents still lay in the future, in more worldly-wise societies.
Baker thoughtfully invented a cover story, posing as one Samuel Munston, of Knoxville,
Tennessee, who supposedly had spent some years in California. A prominent citizen of
Tennessee was produced to check this alibi, and Baker was able to learn by glancing at
the man’s visiting card placed in the President’s appointment schedule that his name
was Brock. When Brock entered the presidential office, Baker preempted by greeting
Brock with his name. He then managed by sheer bluster to convince Brock they were old
acquaintances. Baker secured his release, and returned to Washington to focus on
counterintelligence work.
His exploits eventually resulted in his selection as Pinkerton’s replacement. Pinkerton
had proved to be an erratic and largely ineffective spymaster, above all, because he
endeavored to handle intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and secret service
work concurrently. In a word, Pinkerton and his cohorts were overextended, their
efforts unfocused. Pinkerton bore chief responsibility for the safety of the President,
among other duties, even when he was serving in the field as General McClellan’s chief
provider of tactical intelligence, a task in which he hardly excelled anyway. Moreover,
few of Pinkerton’s men had any prior military experience, and military intelligence
operations differ significantly from detective work. The latter usually necessitates
maintaining underworld contacts and tracking criminal groups, but such an approach is
of limited value for wartime intelligence. For starters, espionage agents are drawn from
a broader spectrum of society than the underworld, and their motives differ from those
of common criminals. Many are moved by patriotism, rather than personal gain, for
instance. Furthermore, accurate insight into an enemy’s plans is vital to assure war’s
efficient conduct. Frederick the Great is credited with having said: “Great advantage is
drawn from knowledge of your adversary, and when you know the measure of his
intelligence and character you can use it to play on his weaknesses.”19 Intelligence is a
tool for preserving a regime; in the case of the American Civil War, the Union. Grasping
the import of certain information, in the trade jargon, separating the “wheat” from the
“chaff,” presupposes considerable sophistication and expertise. Rigidity and
frivolousness are traits that do not spell good fortune in intelligence. Pinkerton’s men
were negotiating a steep learning curve.
Freeman Jr., Chas W., The Diplomat’s Dictionary (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1994), 180.
19
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Baker’s dogged resolution as head of the Secret Service was punctuated by occasional
bursts of ingenuity. One of his agents, Timothy Webster, was established in his cover by
feigning arrest as a Confederate spy, then escaping from pretended imprisonment. With
his credibility thus secured, he was soon able to move in the highest Confederate circles.
Unfortunately for this lucid scheme, Webster fell ill, then became incapacitated. A failed
rescue attempt led to his exposure and proved his undoing. He was arrested and
hanged. Northern popular reaction to what was widely perceived as a cruel outrage
roused anti-Southern sentiment at a time of Union reversals on the battlefield and of
subsequent flagging public morale. Hence, Webster did more for the Union cause in
death as a martyr for freedom than he had done in life as a spy.20 Malicious tongues
even spread the rumor that Union intelligence operatives had “thrown him to the
wolves” for this very purpose.
In another strange twist of fate, a near-hanging made the career of the condemned, one
Reverend T.J. Mann.21 A Southerner, Mann was more saboteur than spy. During an
attempt to employ an incendiary device to blow up a Union powder magazine, Mann
was arrested when the powder failed to explode. Mann is said to have quipped that a
lighted cigar would have worked better. When a group of Union soldiers started to lynch
him, an officer appeared and ordered them to cut him down. Mann survived the war,
and afterwards frequented the lecture circuit, giving his account of being hanged. As
might be expected, his renditions were dramatic and emotion-laden. He described the
sensations of wonderful light and joyous music that have recurred in accounts of neardeath experiences, a great draw in nineteenth-century revival meetings.
More prosaic, but of actual consequence for day-to-day military operations, were the
accomplishments of Brigadier Generals Grenville Dodge in the western theater and
George Sharpe in the east. These capable men demonstrated how operational and
tactical intelligence could improve substantially as the North acquired the attributes of a
national security state. Sharpe would, in fact, rise to become chief of the Union Bureau
of Military Information, one of the most professional military intelligence organizations
of the nineteenth century.22 Dodge, for his part, developed into both a capable military
commander and a proficient intelligence officer, earning a reputation as a Jack-of-alltrades. He was instrumental in forming the Union Army’s local group of spycatchers and
in setting up the central intelligence organization General U.S. Grant urged upon the
Union’s western-theater forces. Dodge organized and for a time commanded the First
Tennessee Cavalry, consisting of Southern Unionists, all the more valuable for
reconnaissance purposes and tactical intelligence collection since they knew Southern
terrain and “spoke Dixie.” Dodge also established the First Alabama Colored Infantry
and Cavalry Regiments, both of which assumed some intelligence collection
responsibilities. Dodge assembled a large cadre of military scouts in the western theater
and was particularly adept at utilizing female couriers, one of whom, Molly Malone,
became associated with the Vicksburg Campaign through her intelligence collection
activities. During the siege of the city, Dodge even placed a spy in Vicksburg who
20
21
22
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supplied crucial information about the city’s defenses and the condition of the besieged
forces there. He pulled off a greater intelligence coup the following year when his
operatives succeeded in penetrating the staff of the Confederate forces defending
Atlanta, and subsequently was able to furnish General Sherman with the enemy orderof-battle and disposition of forces.
In the final year of the war, Sharpe and Dodge were reported to have had hundreds of
intelligence operatives in what was left of the Confederacy. Both accomplished much
with relatively few resources. Yet both men were reserved, apparently secure enough in
their own right not to be boastful of their not insignificant intelligence exploits.23
Neither endeavored to tell the entire story, much less to dramatize it. The only bluster in
which Sharpe ever engaged was to point out occasionally that he had urged General
George Meade to attack the spent Confederate army at Gettysburg and to cut off its path
of retreat. He was probably offering good advice. Dodge and Sharpe used blacks
regularly in intelligence operations, although data and details have been lost to
posterity, and Sharpe proved astute at gleaning information from the Pamunkey Indians
in Virginia as well.
Dodge’s intelligence network eventually operated from middle Tennessee to Richmond
and to the Gulf of Mexico. Although designed primarily to collect information on
Confederate forces and troop dispositions, it was constantly on the lookout for rebel
spies as well. Dodge recruited an old war horse of the army scouts, the intrepid L. A.
Naron, who hailed from Alabama and spoke “deep Dixie,” but was unflinchingly loyal to
the Union. Naron, more commonly known by his nickname “Captain Chickasaw,”
hunted Confederate espionage agents and ran many of the counterintelligence
operations in theater. A cunning military scout, “Captain Chickasaw” would habitually
venture out ahead of the cavalry for a preliminary assessment of enemy strength. Such
work was particularly dangerous and scouts were known to quip they would rather go
into half-a-dozen battles than on one intelligence mission. “The secret service men were
braver than the average soldier,” Dodge said, and he had a special talent for finding such
men.24 His almost uncanny ability to recruit Southerners devoted to the Union cause for
intelligence work bespoke his considerable understanding of human character.
The Black Heritage
Perhaps the most important, certainly the least appreciated, group of Union
sympathizers and thus potential spies in the South was the black population. Many
cases of anonymous blacks providing intelligence to Union forces, as the one who told
General Grant where to land his troops below Vicksburg, are documented. 25 A black
man, John Scobell, through sheer determination, became one of Pinkerton’s most
trusted agents. Tubman repeatedly turned to good account the skills and experience she
gained in her Underground Railroad days, and provided critical information to Federal
forces. Memories of the ante-bellum South, hardly fond ones, were a powerful
motivating factor for her and others. Familiarity with the Southern states and Southern
23
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ways equipped some blacks, probably including Tubman, to assist in counterintelligence
operations also. A new Underground Railroad of sorts sprang up, by which black
families passed along escapees from Southern prison camps until they reached Northern
lines. Tubman’s contributions to the war effort have yet to be systematically analyzed,
and the complete story might never be told.
Later in the war, other black underground organizations, such as the Legal League, were
formed, usually to act as couriers for Federal intelligence operatives.26 Runaway slaves
were routinely interrogated once they entered federally controlled territory. Scobell had
a large hand in such activities. He and his colleagues encouraged educated blacks to
travel to Confederate areas to collect information and to serve as couriers. Black
volunteers were often able to avail themselves of the protection and support accorded by
relatives in the South, but such intelligence assets were not always utilized to the extent
they might have been. Blacks were the unsung heroes of intelligence in the Civil War,
and one can fairly assume that more intelligence collection was conducted by blacks
than we will ever know about. In the atmosphere of late nineteenth-century America,
the exploits of blacks were far less marketable than those of romantic white heroines,
and many black accomplishments simply went unrecorded. In the “Jim Crow” South
especially, blacks were closely associated with Republicanism, and adherents of the
Confederate “lost cause” were given to downplaying the roles blacks assumed in the
defeat. The name Nathan Bedford Forest immediately springs to mind as a case in point.
A Time to Sow, A Time to Reap
Soon after the war, Lafayette Baker completed the scrutinizing History of the Secret
Service.27 Parts of this tome deal with intelligence collection, and some with
rudimentary counterintelligence operations. But much of it discusses other matters
entirely, such as drunkenness among army officers and the ease with which prostitutes
gained entry to army camps. One is left to draw one’s own conclusions about the
bearing, if any, such matters have upon intelligence. It is regrettable that few details
about the recruitment, training, or handling of Union intelligence operatives are on
offer. More has yet to be told.
Agents were regularly recruited for intelligence work, though, and as the war dragged
on, people frequently volunteered their services. At least on the Union side, sporadic
efforts were made to establish and maintain a security network. Yet, despite such
attempts as the cleverly staged arrest of Timothy Webster as a Confederate spy, or the
counterintelligence “sting” operation using the Greenhow establishment as a
“mousetrap,” the systematic counterintelligence and disinformation activities we would
now take for granted in wartime were seldom orchestrated. Nor did self-initiated
intelligence operations have much discernible effect on the war’s end result. We find few
major engagements whose outcome was shaped by intelligence collection and analysis
as, for instance, Anglo-American access to “Ultra” and the decrypted Japanese naval
codes bore upon several World War II campaigns. Slack security, so striking in the case
26
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of the Greenhow clan, was in truth a recurring theme on both sides, underscoring how
disjointed and even droll a business counterintelligence operations could be in the
1860s. Secrets were quite simply not well kept in the first place. Equally disconcerting
from a professional standpoint, valuable intelligence was sometimes not acted upon, or
revealed in such a manner as to provide no protection to sources, hence choking off the
information flow. For example, a young railroad telegrapher, one J. O. Kerbey, who
would later become a Union intelligence operative, ascertained before the First Battle of
Manassas that some Confederate “masked batteries” were actually fakes built of logs,
but Union commanders refused to believe him and ignored the telltale signs. Kerbey
would later operate behind Confederate lines, eventually becoming a telegrapher in a
Southern railway depot, where he would listen in on telegraphic communications in and
out of Richmond. Kerbey also became affiliated with the Van Lew espionage ring. The
larger point, though, is that Confederate “Quaker cannons,” harmless wooden objects
designed to deceive those, like General McClellan, who were susceptible to deception
operations even of the most primitive sort, are now proverbial.
Another notable example of the mistrust of intelligence is to be found in General Lee’s
brusque dismissal of information supplied by Confederate operatives in April 1863, less
than three weeks prior to the Battle of Chancellorsville. According to the intelligence
report, the Union Army of the Potomac disposed of nearly 150,000 effective troops with
10, 000 reinforcements on the way, which was a fairly accurate estimate.28 Taking little
notice, Lee divided his forces and assaulted a superior enemy, winning a brilliant
victory. Although no broader significance of the event has been established by historical
evidence, Lee did, in fact, reluctantly heed the counsel of another spy the following
month after his army had invaded the North. Pure coincidence? Left “blind” in enemy
territory when Stuart’s cavalry detached to conduct its own operations, the Army of
Northern Virginia was spread out and in danger of being defeated in detail. The
operative, who was employed by Lee’s chief lieutenant, General James Longstreet,
warned Lee to concentrate his forces, lest they be demolished. The great battle at
Gettysburg ensued.
On yet another occasion, the hapless Union General Ambrose Burnside discovered that
his orders were being printed verbatim in a Richmond newspaper. He had a British
reporter arrested as a spy, and would have executed the man had higher authority not
intervened. Circumstances surrounding the case remain mysterious. However
Burnside’s orders got to Richmond, it is curious that they were printed in a newspaper,
the quickest and surest method of compromising information. Union forces were tipped
off about the leak almost immediately. It is possible that the newspaper itself, not a
Confederate intelligence operation, was responsible for the revelation.
Leaks to the press were incessant. General Lee’s famous compromised Order Number
191, discovered in a field prior to the Battle of Antiedam in September 1862, which
furnished crucial information about the disposition of the Army of Northern Virginia in
western Maryland, found its way into a Philadelphia newspaper that very month. No one
has even been able to explain exactly how.
28
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The Sweeping Whirlwind’s Sway
Reconstruction in the South provides a sober reminder that great military power cannot
guarantee control of a defeated country. The ability to exploit the internal political
situation within a targeted territory, not mere military might, is a crucial element of
conquest.29 European states, for example, enjoyed greatest success when they were able
to recruit local collaborators from within the society and exploit divisions among elites.
Different configurations of social ties connecting conquerors with elites are central to
both the patterns of conquest and the strategies conquerors employ.30 The lack of such
ties made it difficult to overcome local opposition to reconstruction. Federal government
intelligence about Southern society was woefully inadequate.
Only in a narrow sense was it true that the Union had been preserved. True, the
territorial integrity of the nation had been maintained, but this was practically all. In the
four years of convulsion through which this end was attained, forces had been generated
which rendered impossible a recurrence of ante-bellum conditions. The initial steps in
the readjustment after the termination of hostilities were guided by the widespread
northern belief that the old Union had been maintained; the final steps in
reconstruction revealed with unmistakable clearness the truth of the southern view that
a new Union had been established.
The progress of the American nation in the decade succeeding the Civil War involved
addressing issues as complex as ever taxed the capacity of government. In the North,
the dangerous encroachments of militarism on the domain of civil polity were to be
terminated, and the tremendous financial burdens left by the war were to be diminished
and readjusted so as to be bearable. In the border states, the passions and feuds of a
divided society were to be curbed until time could bring tolerance and reunion. In the
South, a wholly new social and political structure was to be built out of the wreckage of
what conquest had destroyed, and the foundation had to be laid by some distinct
determination of the rights and duties of the freedmen and by the construction of state
governments.
Along with these problems of internal policy, and somewhat in the background, lay
certain questions of foreign relations, which were forced ominously to the forefront
largely by shifting public opinion. Great Britain had won no high favor in either North or
South by its policy during the war, and the French forces in Mexico were an
incontrovertible expression of the malevolent disposition of Napoleon III. With the fall
of the Confederacy it became a seriously debated question in all the political circles of
the North whether it would be well, before reducing the military establishment, to have
a settlement of the grievances which the European powers had so recklessly heaped up
against themselves. Only the imperative and absorbing demands of the home situation
prevented major crises in foreign relations.
“Recent Books,” Foreign Affairs 6:93 (November/December 2014), 185.
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Ultimately, we must attribute strategic and operational intelligence shortfalls to a
general lack of preparedness in America for large-scale conflict and political
reconstruction, and to a decentralized political system with a diminutive executive
branch of government. If President Davis himself could take the time to question a
suspected low-level operative, then quite apparently little time and effort and few
resources were being devoted to the administration of Confederate intelligence and
counterintelligence operations. The Civil War was fought by hundreds of thousands of
troops in America’s age of innocence. As often as not, it was conducted in an informal,
haphazard manner. Fire, sword and war came suddenly to an America that understood
too little of such things. Likewise, intelligence was also in its age of innocence. Had it
been otherwise, the manner of war’s conduct and reconstruction thereafter would not
have been so haphazard. Had it been otherwise, perhaps far fewer would have fought,
suffered and died. If history offers any lesson, this is it.

66
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.3S.1475

